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MANSMANN,  Circuit Judge. 
 On July 20, 1990, Albert C. Reeves was in the process 
of cleaning with a hose the cutter head on the dredging ship, the 
Becky Beth.  Reeves was thrown off the dredge onto a blacktop 
ramp four to six feet below, suffering serious personal injuries. 
At that time, the Becky Beth was assigned to a non-navigable lake 
entirely within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.   
 Reeves filed suit in the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey against Mobile Dredging & Pumping 
Company, Inc., seeking relief under the Jones Act.0  Although 
Jones Act coverage requires that accidents occur on navigable 
waters, Reeves argues that under the "Fleet Seaman Doctrine" a 
seaman does not lose his seaman status when he is temporarily 
assigned to another vessel on non-navigable waters; and thus, 
because he had been assigned to a job on navigable water by a 
previous employer, he is entitled to coverage. 
 We have yet to adopt the Fleet Seaman Doctrine, and we 
take this opportunity to do so now.  Nonetheless, because Reeves' 
only assignment with Mobile was on the Becky Beth, which was on 
non-navigable waters, and because his employment with Mobile was 
totally unrelated to his employment at Great Lakes, we hold that 
the Fleet Seaman Doctrine does not afford him relief.  We also 
take this opportunity to re-examine our test for seaman status 
and modify it to bring it in line with recent Supreme Court 
                                                           
0
 Reeves was joined in the suit by his wife Dolores 
Reeves, whose claims are derivative of her husband's. 
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precedent.  We will affirm the district court's grant of summary 
judgment to the employer/shipowner. 
 
I. 
 Mobile Dredging & Pumping Company, Inc., owner of the 
Becky Beth, employed Reeves as a welder for a dredging project 
that was to be performed on Lake Towhee in Quakertown, 
Pennsylvania.  Reeves is a maritime dredge welder and has been a 
member of Local Marine Union 25, Operating Engineer's Marine 
Division, since 1956.  Apparently the union places its members in 
their various positions when it finds openings.   
 Prior to his employment with Mobile Dredging, Great 
Lakes Dredge & Dock Company employed Reeves on a vessel moored on 
the Staten Island Sound.  On January 2, 1990, Reeves was laid off 
temporarily.  Pursuant to the union contract, he had the right to 
return to his job when work again became available.  He was on 
first call with Great Lakes in late May of 1990 when the union 
asked him to go to work for Mobile Dredging on a temporary, two-
week basis.  For reasons unique to his contract with the union, 
Reeves could not reject the offer without jeopardizing future 
employment opportunities with the union.0 
 At the conclusion of his two week tenure, Mobile asked 
Reeves to stay on to replace another employee who had become ill. 
                                                           
0
 The union is Reeves' business agent.  As soon as he is 
laid off from one job he applies to the union for a new position. 
Under the union contract he is not permitted to solicit jobs on 
his own.   
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As a result, Reeves continued to work for Mobile Dredging as a 
deckhand for six more weeks.   
 The facts of the accident itself are not in dispute. 
Reeves was assigned the task of cleaning the dredge's cutter head 
which was full of mud and silt from the lake's bottom.  Usually 
employees cleaned the cutter head with a 1-1/2 inch fire hose 
attached to a small deck pump.  For some reason a deck pump was 
not available, so Reeves attached a 2-1/2 inch fire hose to a 
larger stationary pump.  The large pump created an amount of 
pressure in the hose strong enough to throw Reeves off the dredge 
and onto a blacktop covered ramp approximately four to six feet 
below the dredge. 
 As a result of the injuries Reeves received from the 
fall, he filed a complaint in the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey.0  The district court granted 
Mobile Dredge's motion for summary judgment, finding that the 
Becky Beth was on non-navigable waters thereby precluding Jones 
Act benefits.0  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1291. 
 
II. 
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury 
in the course of his employment may, at his 
election, maintain an action for damages at 
law, with the right of trial by jury, and in 
such action all statutes of the United States 
modifying or extending the common-law right 
                                                           
0
 Reeves filed two separate workers' compensation 
actions, one through the Pennsylvania Workers Compensation Act, 
and the other pursuant to the Longshore and Harbor Workers 
Compensation Act.  The second claim has been stayed during the 
pendency of this admiralty action. 
0
 We discuss "navigable" waters in Part II.C., infra. 
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or remedy in cases of personal injury to 
railway employees shall apply . . . .   
 
Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688.  In effect the Jones Act provides a 
cause of action in negligence for "any seaman" injured "in the 
course of his employment," the liability for which rests with the 
employer.  Matute v. Lloyd Bermuda Lines, Ltd., 931 F.2d 231, 
235-36 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 329 (1991). 
 Establishment of seaman status is the threshold for a 
Jones Act trial.  (The other elements, "injury" and "in the 
course of employment," are typically easily satisfied.)  It has 
been nearly 20 years since we examined our test set forth for the 
establishment of seaman status.  We held that an employee 
claiming seaman status must establish: 
"(a) that the ship be in navigation; (b) that 
there be a more or less permanent connection 
with the ship; and (c) that the worker be 
aboard primarily to aid in navigation." 
 
Griffith v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 521 F.2d 31, 36 (3d 
Cir. 1975), (quoting M. Norris, The Law of Seaman § 668 at 301 
(3d ed. 1970), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976)).  See also 
Evans v. United States Arab Shipping Co., 4 F.3d 207, 214-15 (3d 
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1065 (1994).  We acknowledge 
that our test is somewhat dated, and informed by more recent 
Supreme Court precedent, we now set about to modify its course.0   
                                                           
0
 Other circuits have established different tests.  The 
Firth Circuit maintains that: 
 
The worker claiming such status must 
establish (1) that he is assigned permanently 
to, or performs a substantial part of his 
work on, (2) a vessel in navigation and (3) 
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 In a recent Supreme Court decision, the Court 
reexamined seaman status and abandoned the "member of the crew" 
and "aid in navigation" tests, setting forth a new standard 
solely in terms of the employee's connection to a vessel in 
navigation.0  McDermott Int'l Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, ___ 
(1991).  In McDermott the Court stated: 
The key to seaman status is employment-
related connection to a vessel in navigation. 
We are not called upon here to define this 
connection in all details, but we hold that a 
necessary element of the connection is that a 
seaman perform the work of a vessel.  In this 
regard, we believe the requirement that an 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
that the capacity in which he is employed, or 
the duty which he performs, contributes to 
the function of the vessel or the 
accomplishment of its mission. 
 
Smith v. Odom Offshore Surveys, Inc., 791 F.2d 411, 415 (5th Cir. 
1986).   
 
 The Second Circuit holds that seaman status is met 
where the jury finds that: 
 
(1) the plaintiff contributed to the function 
of, or helped accomplish the mission of, a 
vessel; (2) the plaintiff's contribution was 
limited to a particular vessel or 
identifiable group of vessels; (3) the 
plaintiff's contribution was substantial in 
terms of its (a) duration or (b) nature; and 
(4) the course of the plaintiff's employment 
regularly exposed the plaintiff to the 
hazards of the sea. 
 
Latsis v. Chandris, Inc., 62 USLW 2619, 1994 WL 96619 (2d Cir. 
1994) (modifying test to comply with McDermott Int'l Inc. v. 
Wilander, 498 U.S. 337 (1991)). 
0
 The "member of the crew" language first surfaced in The 
Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903), and then reappeared in the 
Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, as amended, 33 
U.S.C. §§ 901-950.  See McDermott, 498 U.S. at ___.  The "aid in 
navigation" test was a product of early federal case law.  Id. at 
___. 
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employee's duties must "contribut[e] to the 
function of a vessel or to the accomplishment 
of its mission" captures well an important 
requirement of seaman status.  It is not 
necessary that a seaman aid in navigation or 
contribute to the transportation of the 
vessel, but a seaman must be doing the ship's 
work. 
 
Id. (quoting Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 779 (5th Cir. 
1959)).   
 Therefore, in order to comply with McDermott, we must 
abandon the "aid in navigation" element of our test and replace 
it with the apropos language.  Hence, for Reeves to establish 
himself as a seaman, he must demonstrate that at the time of his 
injury:  (a) he maintained a more or less permanent connection on 
(b) a vessel in navigation; and (c) that his employment 
contributed to the function of the vessel or the accomplishment 
of its mission.   
 Here, the parties do not dispute that Reeves had an 
employment relationship with the defendant Mobile Dredging at the 
time of the accident; nor do they dispute that he was injured in 
the course of his employment.  Further, the parties concur that 
his employment with Mobile Dredging was on a vessel in non-
navigable water.  The problem here with regard to his status as a 
seaman is whether Reeves' former employment with Great Lakes on 
navigable waters served to give him "seaman status" during his 
temporary assignment with Mobile Dredging on non-navigable 
waters, under the Fleet Seaman Doctrine.  As constitutive of this 
inquiry, we will first examine the permanency and nature of 
Reeves' connection with the Becky Beth. 
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A. 
 There is seemingly an unresolved issue regarding 
whether the "permanent connection" requirement for seaman status 
has survived McDermott; however, because we find that Reeves 
would satisfy that requirement under either the pre- or post-
McDermott analysis, we need not decide this issue.   
 The Fifth Circuit has maintained that the "permanent 
connection" requirement has survived McDermott.  Bach v. Trident 
S.S. Co., 920 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1991), vacated and remanded, 111 
S. Ct. 2253, reaff'd on remand, 947 F.2d 1290 (5th Cir. 1991), 
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1996 (1992).  We have acknowledged this 
position, but have failed to reach the issue.  Evans v. United 
Arab Shipping Co., 4 F.3d 207, 214-15 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. 
denied, 114 S.Ct. 1065 (1994).  The Supreme Court has held that 
it is a jury determination whether the injured worker was 
permanently attached to and employed by the vessel as a member of 
its crew.  Senko v. LaCrosse Dredging Corp., 352 U.S. 370, 372 
(1957). 
 In Griffith v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 521 
F.2d 31, 37 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976), 
we stated:  "There must be a more or less permanent connection or 
attachment between the vessel and the worker as opposed to a 
temporary relationship."  In Mach v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 317 
F.2d 761, 764 (3d Cir. 1963), we held:  "The duration of service 
for and upon a vessel may determine whether shipboard work which 
is not normally performed by a ship's company makes the worker a 
10 
crewman, but lack of long continued attachment to the vessel 
cannot, as a matter of law, serve to deny seaman's status under 
the Jones Act to an employee who is injured while assigned to and 
performing normal crew service."  See Evans, 4 F.2d at 215 n.7.0 
 We begin with the uncontrovertible fact that Reeves was 
hired as a temporary employee of Mobile Dredging.  He was 
initially employed for a two week period and then asked to stay 
on to replace an ailing co-worker.  Rather than determine whether 
the "permanent connection" requirement survives McDermott, we 
hold that even applying a "permanent connection" analysis, the 
employer's request for Reeves to stay on indefinitely provides 
him the permanent status contemplated in Griffith and Mach.  In 
Griffith, the plaintiff's contact with the employer amounted to 
only 3-3/4 days out of the 74 days of his employment relationship 
with the defendant, which we found insufficient to maintain 
seaman status.  Reeves' employment with Mobile Dredging was on an 
                                                           
0
 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held 
that the permanency factor is not a literal requirement.  Ardoin 
v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 641 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981).   
 
The question whether a claimant was 
"permanently" assigned to a vessel is, thus, 
"more frequently an analytical starting point 
than a self-executing formula."  The 
"permanency" requirement is, we think, best 
understood as indicating that in order to be 
deemed a "seaman" within the meaning of the 
Jones Act "a claimant [must] have more than a 
transitory connection" with a vessel or a 
specific group of vessels.   
 
Id. at 281 (citations omitted).  Cf. Latsis v. Chandris, Inc., 
1994 WL 96619 (2d Cir. 1994) (defining permanency as substantial 
in terms of duration and nature). 
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indefinite, every day basis.  This, we hold, gives him the 
permanent connection to the Becky Beth required under the pre-
McDermott analysis; notwithstanding that, he would certainly 
satisfy the connection contemplated in McDermott. 
 McDermott does not speak of permanency; rather its 
discussion centered on the requirement that the employee 
contribute to the function of the vessel or assist in the 
accomplishment of its mission.  See Southwest Marine, Inc., v. 
Gizoni, 112 S.Ct. 486 (1991) (applying McDermott).  Reeves became 
a deckhand for the Becky Beth and at the time of the accident was 
in the process of cleaning the silt and mud from the dredge's 
cutter head, which we assume to be the equipment performing or 
assisting in performing the actual dredging of the bottom of the 
waterway upon which the vessel was working.  Thus, it is without 
doubt that Reeves was contributing to the function of the vessel 
and to the accomplishment of its mission; and therefore, assuming 
the non-existence of the permanency requirement, he satisfies the 
connection contemplated in McDermott. 
 
B. 
 A Jones Act claimant must also establish an employment 
relationship, either with the owner of the vessel or with some 
other employer who assigns the employee to a task creating the 
proper connection with a vessel.  Guidry v. South Louisiana 
Contractors, Inc., 614 F.2d 447, 452 (5th Cir. 1980).0   
                                                           
0
 There is no requirement that the employer be the owner 
or even the operator of the vessel.  Matute v. Lloyd Bermuda 
12 
 The existence of the employment relationship is a 
question of fact, and the inquiry turns on the degree of control 
the alleged employer exerts over the employee.  Matute, 931 F.2d 
at 236.0    Here it is without doubt that Reeves was an employee 
of Mobile Dredging.  Although he was first given a temporary two-
week assignment, the fact that Mobile Dredging asked him to stay 
on indefinitely to replace an ailing co-worker supports his claim 
of an employment relationship.  Mobile Dredging does not dispute 
that Reeves was its employee. 
 Additionally, it is not sufficient that Reeves 
establish an employment relationship; as we stated above, he must 
also demonstrate that he contributed to the function of the Becky 
Beth or to the accomplishment of its mission.  McDermott, 498 
U.S. at ___.  As we so noted above, Reeves' task was cleaning the 
cutter head, and in this, he was contributing to the function of 
the vessel and assisting in the accomplishment of its mission. 
 
C. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Lines, Ltd., 931 F.2d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing Volyrakis 
v. M/V Isabelle, 668 F.2d 863, 865 (5th Cir. 1982)), cert. 
denied, 1125 S.Ct. 329 (1991).  Independent contractors have been 
found to be liable under the Jones Act, and it is even possible 
for a seaman to have more than one Jones Act employer, Guidry, 
614 F.2d at 452, although only one could be sued as the employer 
responsible for the negligent act.  Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. 
McAllister, 337 U.S. 783, 791 (1949). 
0
 Some of the factors demonstrating control include 
payment, direction, supervision, and discretion to hire and fire. 
Matute, 931 F.2d at 236.  If a third party borrows an employee 
from a Jones Act employer, that third party may become a Jones 
Act employer if it assumes the requisite amount of control over 
the employee.  Guidry, 614 F.2d at 452. 
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 Although the requirement is not expressly stated in the 
statute, the Supreme Court has long required that the injury 
occur through the employee's relationship to a vessel on a 
navigable body of water.  Swanson v. Marra Bros., 328 U.S. 1, 6 
(1946).  See also McDermott, 498 U.S. at ___.  A body of water is 
navigable for purposes of federal admiralty jurisdiction if it is 
one that, by itself or by uniting with other waterways, forms a 
continuous highway capable of sustaining interstate or foreign 
commerce.  The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870).   
 Here Lake Towhee is a man-made, landlocked lake 
entirely within the borders of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 
There are no waterways connecting it to any other state. 
Therefore, the district court was correct in holding that an 
intrastate, landlocked lake, in particular Lake Towhee, is non-
navigable for purposes of federal jurisdiction.   
 Reeves concedes that Lake Towhee is a non-navigable 
waterway, and thus the Jones Act is ostensibly unavailing. Reeves 
argues, nonetheless, that under the "Fleet Seaman Doctrine," a 
seaman does not lose his seaman status when his employer 
temporarily assigns him to another vessel on non-navigable 
waters.  Although he had not previously worked for Mobile 
Dredging and although it assigned him to a single, non-navigable 
vessel, he suggests that the "Fleet Seaman Doctrine" would apply 
here.  We have not had an occasion to examine this rule and 
therefore undertake this task now. 
 
III. 
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 The Fleet Seaman Doctrine is a product of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit by virtue of 
Braniff v. Jackson Ave.-Gretna Ferry, Inc., 280 F.2d 523 (5th 
Cir. 1960).  Braniff was employed as a superintendent in charge 
of maintenance on several ferries operating in the port of New 
Orleans.  At the time of the accident Braniff was in a work boat 
tied to the side of one of the employer's ferries, and while he 
was making repairs to the machinery of the ferry, the work boat 
capsized and Braniff drowned.  Id. at 525.   
 Braniff was not employed on any particular ferry; 
rather he was responsible for all maintenance and repair work to 
the marine and shore equipment belonging to the company.  It was 
common for him and members of his staff to meet each morning at 
the waterfront.  He would usually board each of the ferries to 
determine whether any repair or maintenance work was necessary. 
There were times when Braniff assigned tasks to be completed by 
other members of the maintenance crew, and times where his 
personal attention was required on the job.  Occasionally, the 
work would take Braniff to the company's shop on shore.  And of 
course, Braniff did not maintain his quarters on board any of the 
ferries.  He lived ashore and worked daily hours; however, he was 
on 24-hour notice in case of emergencies.  Id. at 525-26. 
 The district court held that because Braniff was not a 
member of the crew of a particular vessel, he was not a seaman 
for purposes of the Jones Act; the court therefore granted 
summary judgment for the employer.  Id. at 526.  The court of 
appeals disagreed, holding that although it is usual for a person 
15 
to have Jones Act seaman status in relation to a particular 
vessel, there is nothing in the concept which limits it to a 
single ship.  Braniff, 280 F.2d at 528 (expanding on its decision 
in Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959)).  The 
court concluded that the elements of seaman status can be 
satisfied, in addition to the traditional way,0 if the employee 
is assigned to several specific vessels or performs a substantial 
part of his work on several specific vessels.  Id. (citing 
Robison, 266 F.2d at 779).  "Of course, it must not be spasmodic 
and the relationship between the individual and the several 
identifiable ships must be substantial in point of time and 
work."  Id. at 528.  Braniff was found to qualify as a seaman.0 
                                                           
0
 In Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 
1959) the court of appeals had held: 
 
[T]here is an evidentiary basis for a Jones 
Act case to go to the jury:  (1) if there is 
evidence that the injured workman was 
assigned permanently to a vessel (including 
special purpose structures not usually 
employed as a means of transport by water but 
designed to float on water) or performed a 
substantial part of his work on the vessel; 
and (2) if the capacity in which he was 
employed or the duties which he performed 
contributed to the function of the vessel or 
to the accomplishment of its mission, or to 
the operation or welfare of the vessel in 
terms of its maintenance during its movement 
or during anchorage for its future trips. 
 
Id. at 779.  This test has been modified through the years.  See 
DiGiovanni v. Traylor Bros., Inc., 959 F.2d 1119, 1122-23 (1st 
Cir. 1992).  
0
 In another Fifth Circuit case, the court of appeals 
concluded in a similar fashion, expanding on Robison without 
citing Braniff: 
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 Reeves relies on another fleet seaman case in support 
of his position:  Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 545 F.2d 422 
(5th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 618 (1978). 
There a helicopter, used to ferry workmen to and from the 
offshore drilling sites, crashed into the Gulf of Mexico, and the 
estate of one of the passengers brought suit under, inter alia, 
the Jones Act.  The district court found that the passenger, 
because he was employed on a fixed drilling platform and not a 
drilling barge, was, as a matter of law, not a seaman under the 
Jones Act.  Id. at 432. 
 The court of appeals disagreed, finding that much of 
the evidence introduced at trial demonstrated that during the two 
years before his death, the passenger worked on submersible 
drilling rigs which were previously held to be Jones Act vessels. 
The evidence also showed that Mobil had temporarily assigned the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
We do not believe that Offshore Co. v. 
Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959), 
restricts a seaman to a person assigned only 
to one vessel.  Rather, a person can be 
assigned to a fleet of vessels and the 
question is sufficient to go to the jury as 
long as he was assigned permanently to these 
vessels or performed a substantial part of 
his work on these vessels and if the capacity 
in which he was employed or the duties which 
he performed contributed to the function of 
these vessels, or to the accomplishment of 
its mission, or to the operation or welfare 
of these vessels in terms of maintenance 
during its movement or during anchorage for 
its future trips. 
 
Bazile v. Bisso Marine Co., Inc., 606 F.2d 101, 104 (5th Cir. 
1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 829 (1980)(footnote omitted). 
17 
passenger to the fixed drilling platform as a replacement for a 
vacationing co-worker.  Id.    
 The court of appeals relied on the proposition that an 
employee may claim seaman status despite being stationed on 
several different vessels during the course of his employment. 
Id. (citing Braniff v. Jackson Avenue-Gretna Ferry, Inc., 280 
F.2d 523, 528 (5th Cir. 1960)).  The court noted that once it is 
established that the injured party is a seaman, the Jones Act 
permits recovery even if the plaintiff sues for injuries received 
while off the ship and engaged in temporary work for the employer 
unrelated to the service of the ship.  Id. (Citing Braen v. 
Pfeifer Oil Transp. Co., 361 U.S. 129 (1959)).  Consequently, the 
Fifth Circuit held that the situs of work is not determinative in 
a Jones Act case; and thus, the passenger was a seaman despite 
his intermittent temporary assignments to the fixed platforms 
because he worked predominantly on the submersible drilling 
barges.  Id. at 433.  See Smith v. Odom Offshore Surveys Inc., 
791 F.2d 411, 415 (5th Cir. 1986) ("Neither the situs of the 
employee's work, nor the place of injury, is determinative in a 
Jones Act case.  A seaman does not lose his status because he is 
temporarily assigned by his employer to duties off his vessel.") 
 In another Jones Act case addressing Higginbotham, the 
Fifth Circuit discussed the fact that once an employee is labeled 
a seaman, his status may be interrupted, either temporarily or 
permanently, depending upon the events that transpire; and 
notwithstanding his or his employer's intentions that he remain 
or again become a seaman.  Guidry v. South Louisiana Contractors 
18 
Inc., 614 F.2d 447, 453 (5th Cir. 1980).  The critical inquiry is 
whether the injured party maintained his status as a seaman on 
the date of the injury.  See Savoie v. Otto Candies, Inc., 692 
F.2d 363, 365 (5th Cir. 1982); Smith, 791 F.2d at 415. 
The seaman in Higginbotham remained in the 
employment of the same employer throughout. 
It follows from this decision that a seaman's 
status does not cease at the moment he is 
required by his employer to work ashore. 
However, Higginbotham does not imply that a 
maritime worker assigned to work ashore for a 
very long period of time would continue 
indefinitely to be a seaman merely because it 
is contemplated that he will someday return 
to the vessel, nor that a seaman's status 
continues if he commences work for another 
employer.   
 
Guidry, 614 F.2d at 453.  See also Savoie, 692 F.2d at 365-66. 
 Having discussed the development of the Fleet Seaman 
Doctrine and noting that such has not been the rule for the Third 
Circuit, we must now determine whether we will adopt the Fleet 
Seaman Doctrine as espoused in the Fifth Circuit.   
  
IV. 
 The Fifth Circuit precedent is not at all a radical 
vein in maritime jurisprudence.  In fact, we view it as a 
consistent expansion of United States Supreme Court precedent. 
For example, in Senko v. LaCrosse Dredging Corp., 352 U.S. 370 
(1956), the plaintiff, a handyman, was hired to assist in the 
employer's dredging operations.  He was injured when a coal stove 
exploded while he was placing signal lanterns from the dredge 
into a shed on shore.  The Supreme Court held that occurrence of 
19 
the injury on land was not material, rather Jones Act coverage 
depended only on a finding that the injured party was "an 
employee of the vessel, engaged in the course of his employment" 
at the time of the injury.  Id. at 373 (quoting Swanson v. Marra 
Bros., Inc., 328 U.S. 1, 4 (1946), citing O'Donnell v. Great 
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36 (1943)).  
 In Swanson the Supreme Court held that Jones Act 
jurisdiction does not depend on the place of injury, but on the 
nature of the seaman's service, his status as a member of the 
vessel, his relationship to the vessel and its operation in 
navigable waters.  Swanson, 328 U.S. at 4-5.  Similarly, in 
O'Donnell, the Court held that Jones Act recovery depends, not on 
the place of injury, but on the nature of the service and its 
relationship to the operation of the vessel in navigable waters. 
O'Donnell, 318 U.S. at 42-43. 
 As we stated above, traditionally a seaman's status is 
tied to a particular vessel, resulting in an employee losing his 
seaman status if he is assigned to a non-navigable vessel, even 
if within the employer's fleet.  The Fleet Seaman Doctrine in our 
view applies to an employee, one who is predominantly assigned by 
his employer to a navigable vessel, but who occasionally is 
assigned by that same employer to non-navigable vessels.  It 
would also apply to one who is assigned to a number of navigable 
vessels and spends some time on shore, as in Braniff.  The 
doctrine protects the employee from losing his status as a seaman 
when on temporary non-navigable assignments or when assignments 
to a number of vessels preclude attachment to one.  As the 
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Supreme Court has recognized, stripping seaman status from such 
an employee, or allowing that same employee to oscillate between 
seaman and non-seaman status, is not only elusive, but in the 
face of injury would be a travesty of justice.0 
 Nearly 60 years ago Justice Cardozo, in a case 
construing the meaning of the term "seaman" in the same statute 
that we examine here today, stated that a statute "must be read 
in the light of the mischief to be corrected and the end to be 
obtained."  Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 158 (1934) (holding 
that the master of a tugboat is a seaman within the meaning of 
the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (the Jones Act)).  The Court 
stated that the policy of liberal construction announced at the 
statute's inception has been steadfastly maintained.  Id. at 156. 
In that vein, we have recently stated that because the Jones Act 
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 Seaman status cannot maintain indefinitely where the 
employee is not connected to a navigable vessel.  In discussing 
the effect of an assignment to work ashore, the Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit has held: 
 
[H]ow long a seaman's status continues after 
a shoreside assignment is itself a fact 
question dependent on such factors as the 
duration of the assignment, its relationship 
to the employer's business, whether the 
employee was free to accept or reject it 
without endangering his employment status and 
any other factors relevant to the ultimate 
inquiry:  at the moment of injury was the 
employee a seaman by conventional Jones Act 
criteria who happened not to be on navigable 
waters, or was he at that time no longer a 
seaman whatever his past relationship or his 
future prospects? 
 
Guidry v. South Louisiana Contractors Inc., 614 F.2d 447, 453 
(5th Cir. 1980). 
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creates new rights for seamen, it shall be liberally construed to 
accomplish its beneficial purposes.  Evans v. United Arab 
Shipping Co. S.A.G., 4 F.3d 207, 214 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing 
Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783, 790 
(1949)), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1065 (1994). 
 In light of that liberal construction and the purposes 
to be served by the Jones Act, the Fleet Seaman Doctrine is a 
reasonable extension of the Senko, Swanson and O'Donnell trilogy. 
Indeed, the cases from the Fifth Circuit establishing this rule 
of law have these cases as their genesis.  See Magnolia Towing 
Co. v. Pace, 378 F.2d 12, 13  (5th Cir. 1967); Braniff v. Jackson 
Ave.-Gretna Ferry, Inc., 280 F.2d 523, 528 (5th Cir. 1960) 
(citing Robison); Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 776-79 
(5th Cir. 1959).  See also Braen v. Pfeifer Oil Transp. Co., 361 
U.S. 129, 132-33 (1959).  Therefore, we hold that the Fleet 
Seaman Doctrine shall be the rule of law in this circuit in 
analyzing Jones Act cases because we believe, as the Fifth 
Circuit has demonstrated, that the doctrine comports well with 
and flows logically from Supreme Court precedent. 
 
V. 
 We must now determine whether the Fleet Seaman Doctrine 
as applied to Reeves, affords him any relief.  The key to the 
Fleet Seaman Doctrine is that the seaman maintain the employment 
relationship with the same employer.  The term "fleet" refers to 
the fleet of vessels owned by the employer, not the fleet of 
vessels on which the employee has worked.  See Bach v. Trident 
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Steamship Co. Inc., 920 F.2d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1991).  The twist 
here is that Reeves had maintained the status of a seaman with 
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock, but then was laid off prior to his 
injury.  Upon taking the new position with Mobile Dredging, 
Reeves lost his seaman status.   
 Reeves asserts that his maritime union assigned him to 
the job, and thus, he should not be deemed to have lost his 
seaman status upon his layoff from Great Lakes.  He had been a 
dredge welder for 33 years and a member of the maritime union 
since 1956.  His assignment to the Becky Beth at the time of his 
accident was merely temporary, and he had the right to return to 
his position with Great Lakes when work again became available, 
even if it meant leaving the job with Mobile Dredging.  Reeves 
submits that he had concurrent job assignments, similar to the 
employee in Higginbotham -- a permanent assignment on navigable 
waters and a temporary assignment on Lake Towhee.  His 
assignment, although not by his maritime employer, was through 
his maritime union, which Reeves argues should be viewed as 
standing in the shoes of an employer for purposes of the Fleet 
Seaman Doctrine.   
 We understand Reeves' argument to be threefold.  He is 
attempting to combine the status he enjoyed while working for 
Great Lakes with the status he maintained while working for 
Mobile Dredging, to associate himself with the navigable vessels 
comprising the Mobile Dredging fleet although he was assigned 
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only to the Becky Beth, and to combine the vessels from each 
employers' fleet into one single fleet.0 
 The facts of Senko, Swanson and O'Donnell demonstrate 
that the plaintiffs were contributing to the function of the 
vessel, which, in each case, was operating in navigable waters. 
Only one employer was involved.  Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has 
held that a fleet is an "identifiable group of vessels acting 
together or under one control."  Barrett v. Chevron, U.S.A., 
Inc., 781 F.2d 1067, 1074 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc).  In Barrett 
the Fifth Circuit rejected the argument Reeves is making here, 
that a fleet of vessels is any group of vessels an employee 
happens to work aboard.  The Fifth Circuit concluded that 
"[u]nless fleet is given its ordinary meaning, the fundamental 
distinction between members of a crew and transitory maritime 
workers such as longshoremen is totally obliterated."  Id. 
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 Reeves further argues that the district court assumed 
for purposes of the defendant's motion that the Becky Beth was to 
be used on navigable waters in the future and that Reeves' 
service to the vessel at the time of injury was in preparation 
for the ship's use in navigable waters.  This argument stretches 
the navigable water requirement beyond its limits.  The Becky 
Beth was on a non-navigable waterway preparing to continue 
operation on the non-navigable waterway.  It is of no matter that 
it was used or will be used again in navigable waters.  Because 
the Jones Act protects only seamen, the claimant must be a seaman 
at the time of the injury -- the fact that he was once a seaman 
and that he or his employer intends for him to become a seaman 
once again will not suffice to cloak with seaman status the 
employee who has stepped out of seaman status, regardless of how 
near or remote in time or place, saving, of course, the temporary 
assignment exception set forth in the Senko, Swanson, and 
O'Donnell.  Guidry v. South Louisiana Contractors, Inc., 614 F.2d 
447, 453 (5th Cir. 1980).   
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 Here, Reeves did not maintain a relationship with the 
same employer.  He was first employed with Great Lakes Dredge and 
Dock and was subsequently laid off.  The union then assigned him 
to a position with Mobile Dredging & Pumping.  It is without 
doubt that Reeves was a seaman when working for Great Lakes --the 
Staten Island Sound is certainly a navigable waterway. However, 
Great Lakes did not direct Reeves to begin working on the Becky 
Beth, nor did it have any authority over him once he began 
working there.  Reeves' employment with Great Lakes was simply 
unrelated to his employment with Mobile Dredging.  The fact that 
Reeves came from Great Lakes with seaman status is of no account 
to Mobile Dredging.  Therefore, Reeves' attempt to link the 
status he enjoyed while working for Great Lakes with the status 
he maintained while working for Mobile Dredging must fail.  
 Similarly, Reeves' attempt to associate himself with 
the fleet of Mobile Dredging vessels on navigable waters must 
also fail because he was assigned only to the Becky Beth.  He was 
never assigned to any other Mobile Dredging vessel nor given any 
other assignment that would connect him to the Mobile Dredging 
fleet. 
 We agree with the en banc opinion in Barrett, that a 
fleet is an identifiable group of vessels acting together or 
under one control.  Although the idea of "one control" is not 
entirely definite and will often depend on the circumstances, the 
Becky Beth and the vessels belonging to Great Lakes were 
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certainly not part of the same fleet.0  The case law uniformly 
rejects the claim that "fleet" means any group of vessels an 
employee happens to work aboard.0  At a minimum, the ships must 
take their direction from one identifiable central authority to 
constitute a fleet.  Here, Great Lakes, because it was a 
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 For example, in Bertrand v. International Mooring & 
Marine Inc., 700 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 
1069 (1984), the court held that it would not allow employers to 
deny Jones Act coverage to seaman by arranging with third parties 
to supply its vessels and assign the work.  However, the court 
also stated:  
 
We have never held that a seaman is barred 
from coverage under the Jones Act if the 
employer neither owns nor controls the 
several vessels upon which the seaman works. 
Instead, we have specifically held that in 
the context of the single vessel, the 
employer need not be the owner or operator of 
the vessel for Jones Act liability to attach. 
To require common ownership or control when 
seaman work on several vessels but not when 
they work on a single vessel is inconsistent 
with the liberal construction of the Jones 
Act that has characterized it from the 
beginning and is inconsistent with its 
purposes.   
 
Id. at 245 (citations omitted).  But see Buras v. Commercial 
Testing & Engineering Co., 736 F.2d 307, 311 (5th Cir. 1984) 
("Bertrand must be read in light of the factual situation it 
involved.").   
0
 See Ardleigh v. Schlumberger Ltd., 832 F.2d 933, 934 
(5th Cir. 1987) (holding that employment on 30 unconnected 
vessels does not meet test for seaman status); Lirette v. N.L. 
Sperry Sun, Inc., 831 F.2d 554, 555-56 (5th Cir. 1987) (denying 
seaman status to a worker who spent 75-80% of his time working on 
drilling rigs owned by 23 different companies) (Langston v. 
Schlumberger Offshore Services, Inc., 809 F.2d 1192, 1194 (5th 
Cir. 1987) (working on 15 different vessels belonging to 10 
different employers does not qualify one as a seaman); Bach v. 
Trident Steamship Co., Inc., 920 F.2d 322, 324-26 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(seaman status denied a river pilot who worked on a large number 
of unconnected vessels).   
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different company and had no contractual or other similar 
relationship with Mobile Dredging, had no control over the Becky 
Beth.  Thus, although Great Lakes had formerly employed Reeves, 
the Becky Beth was simply not part of its fleet. 
 In sum, we must reject Reeves' Jones Act claim because 
his only employment with Mobile Dredging was solely on the Becky 
Beth, which was on non-navigable waters, and because he was 
disassociated from the Great Lakes fleet of vessels at the time 
of his injury.  Thus we conclude that the Fleet Seaman Doctrine 
does not save Reeves his Jones Act coverage.0   
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 We view our decision consistent with that of the Ninth 
Circuit in Stanfield v. Shellmaker, Inc., 869 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 
1989).  Stanfield was a dredge surveyor.  He designed the dredge 
cuts, plotted the positions and calculated the daily production 
of the vessel upon which he worked.  When he completed a job, he 
was laid off until he was rehired for a new job.  At the time of 
his accident, Stanfield was working on the dredge ship, the 
Traveler, on a non-navigable waterway -- a landlocked artificial 
waterway lying entirely within the state of California.  Similar 
to this case, the dredge was capable of being disassembled and 
transported over land.  Id. at 522.  Also similar to this case, 
both Stanfield and the Traveler had previously worked on 
navigable waters. 
 
 Stanfield argued that despite the vessel's operation in 
non-navigable waters, the Fleet Seaman Doctrine, as articulated 
by the Fifth Circuit, qualifies him as a seaman.  However, the 
Ninth Circuit, assuming without deciding that the Fleet Seaman 
Doctrine applied, stated that the doctrine was devised to ease 
the requirement that a seaman be assigned permanently to a 
vessel.  The court interpreted the Fleet Seaman Doctrine to 
presuppose a permanent assignment to a number of vessels on 
navigable water, not a single vessel on non-navigable waters. 
Thus, because Stanfield was permanently assigned to a vessel 
operating in non-navigable waters, the Fleet Seaman Doctrine was 
unavailing.  The court found irrelevant the fact that Stanfield 
had worked on other navigable vessels and that the Traveler had 
traversed on navigable waters.  Id. at 525. 
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VI. 
 Therefore, although we take this opportunity to adopt 
for this circuit the Fleet Seaman Doctrine, because Reeves was 
not within the fleet of vessels owned by Great Lakes Dredge and 
Dock, his original employer, at the time of his injury, but 
rather was employed by Mobile Dredging on a single vessel on a 
non-navigable waterway, Jones Act coverage is not available to 
him.  We will thus enter an order affirming the judgment of the 
district court. 
